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SURVEY OF OHIO LAW - 1957
the defendant had started business as the United Lamp Company in 1910.
The plaintiff had continuously operated as the United Electric Fixture
and Supply Company either as a corporation or partnership since 1913.
The United Lamp Company had changed its name to United Electric
Supply Company in 1954 in order that its corporate name might be more
descriptive of its wholesale business, without any purpose to deceive the
public or divert any of the plaintiff's business. While some evidence of
slight confusion was presented, the court found no direct evidence or
reasonable inference from the facts to establish any financial loss or
probability of future damage resulting to plaintiff from the defendant's
use of the new' corporate name. Thus, finding no evidence of real con-
fusion or damage, the court held that under principles of equity there
was insufficient basis for granting an injunction.9 Two important facts
which influenced the court were the long use of the word "United" by
both parties and the type of customers dealing with both parties, namely
persons and organizations which purchase at wholesale.
The court distinguished a line of Ohio cases'0 dealing with actions
against defendants who were competing with the plaintiffs in business
done with the public in general, indicating that transactions with the
general public should be distinguished from the type of dealing indicated
in the principal case. But the most important lesson to be drawn from
unfair competition cases is the necessity of deciding each case upon the
basis of the particular facts involved.
MAUICE S. CULP
TRUSTS
Surviving Spouse: Invasion of Inter Vivos Trust
In Darrow v. Fifth Third Union Trust Co.,1 a husband created a valid,
amendable, inter vivos trust. In essence the trust agreement provided
that, upon the death of the settlor, his widow was to receive a life estate
9The court held that OHIo REV. CODE § 1701.08 could not apply since the defend-
ant acquired its corporate name first and there was no evidence that the plaintiff had
reserved its name. The plaintiff therefore had to base its case upon principles of
equity and the statutes providing for relief by injunction.
" Cleveland Opera Co. v. Cleveland Civic Opera Ass'n, Inc. 22 Ohio App. 400, 154
N.E. 352 (1936), in which an injunction against the use of the name "Cleveland
Civic Opera Association, Inc." was granted because the use thereof would amount
to unfair competition, despite the fact that defendant's organization had not been
completed and no attempt had been made to transact business; Stern Furniture Com-
pany v. Stern, 83 N.E.2d 804 (Ohio Ct. App. 1948), enjoining a retailer-defendant
from using the names "Stern," "Stern Furniture," "Stern Brothers," or "Stern Broth-
ers Company" in connection with the defendant's retail furniture and household ap-
pliance business within the plaintiff's retail trading area.
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consisting of the income from the corpus of the trust, and upon her death
the principal was to be paid to the University of Michigan. There were
not sufficient funds in the estate outside the inter vivos trust funds to
pay the widow's year's allowance 2 in full. She elected to take against the
will of her husband. In an action for judgment declaring the widow's
rights in the inter vivos trust, the court held:
(1) The Ohio Supreme Court has stated the rule in the Bolles and
Harris cases8 that, the widow, having elected to take against the will and
under the law, may assert her rights to a distributive share of the prop-
erty in the inter vivos trust. Further, that the balance due on the widow's
year's allowance was to be paid from the corpus of the trust, and paid
before her distributive share was taken from the trust.
(2) The life interest of the widow under the trust ceased when she
elected to take against the will, and
(3) The remainder interest of the University of Michigan acceler-
ated and became payable immediately.
Critics of the doctrine which permits a surviving spouse to reach the
property of a revocable or amendable inter vivos trust often object on the
ground that it is illogical to treat the trust as testamentary insofar as the
surviving spouse is concerned, but as a valid inter vivos trust as to all
others. However, it would not seem to be a question of logic, but a
matter of policy; a matter of deciding whether a spouse is to be allowed
to retain the ownership of property for all practical purposes during his
or her lifetime and yet have the relict deprived of the statutory share up-
on the death of the other spouse. An analogy is provided by the provisions
of the Federal Estate Tax Law wherein various interests retained by a
decedent in his lifetime are held part of his gross estate for estate tax
purposes, even though these interests do not pass from him by testate
or intestate succession.4
Spendthrift Trust: Invasion of Beneficiary's
Interest By Wife and Children
Whether the interest of a beneficiary of a spendthrift trust may be
reached by his wife and children to enforce their claims against him for
alimony and support is a matter upon which two Ohio common pleas
courts reached different conclusions. In McIYilliams v. McWilliams,5
"'139 N.E.2d 112 (Ohio C.P. 1953).
2 See Oio REv. CODE § 2117.20.
'Bolles v. Toledo Trust Co., 144 Ohio St. 195, 58 N.E.2d 381 (1944); Harris v.
Harris, 147 Ohio St. 437, 72 N.E.2d 378 (1947).
'68A STAT. 382, 383, 26 U.S.C. §§ 2037-38 (1954).
'140 N.E.2d 80 (Ohio C.P. 1956).
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the court held that the interest of a husband under a spendthrift trust
could not be reached by the wife and children, including funds which
were due and owing to the husband but which had not yet been paid
over by the trustee to the husband-beneficiary. In O'Connor v. O'Con-
nor,6 the spendthrift provision was held not to prevent the subjection of
the husband's interest to the claims of his wife and children for alimony
and support in a trust in which the husband would enjoy benefits upon
the death of his mother. Since the husband's interest would not mature
until after the death of his mother, the court made no attempt to fix the
amounts of alimony and support payments, but continued the cause until
such beneficiary's death.
There is respectable authority outside Ohio supporting the view of
both cases. The matter is simply one of policy, which perhaps could
best be decided by the legislature.7
Although forfeiture for alienation clauses were present in both cases,
the possibility of forfeiture was not discussed in the McWilliams case. In
the O'Connor case, in holding that no forfeiture resulted, the court stated:
... at any rate, there is no difficulty in their [wife and children benefid-
ary) enforcing their claims for support against the trust estate if the settlor
did not show an intent to exclude them.... In this respect they stand in the
beneficiary's shoes. They are in pari statu with him [the beneficiary].
His rights are their rights. If he should attempt to assert his rights it
would not invoke the forfeiture clause. Neither would it if his wife and
children attempted to assert his rights, which are also theirs. This obtains
by virtue of the nature of the duty to support and the legal and social con-
sequences of failure to support, and it adheres in the majority rule allow-
ing invasion by dependents despite attempted restraints8
The writer feels the reasons set forth by the court to support their
decision are somewhat illusory. Simpler and more direct reasons appear
to exist. A restraint upon alienation by means of a spendthrift clause is
a direct restraint. A provision for forfeiture upon alienation or attempted.
alienation is indirect. Once it is determined that a provision directly
restraining alienation, (i.e., a spendthrift clause which prevents the wife
and children from enforcing their claims for alimony or support against
the trust estate) is against public policy, it should follow that a provision
indirectly restraining alienation, such as a forfeiture clause, is invalid.
Discretionary Trust
A testamentary trust directed that the trustee pay over the whole or
any part of the trust corpus to the beneficiary, at such times and in such
8141 N.E.2d 691 (Ohio C.P. 1957).
7 Several states have enacted legislation permitting the wife and children to reach the
beneficiary's interests. See GRiswOLD, SPENDTRIFT TAuSTS, § 341 (2d ed. 1947).
8141 N.E.2d 691, 696 (Ohio C.P. 1957).
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amounts as the trustee might deem advisable. The objection was made
that the payment or nonpayment was left entirely to the whim of the
tfustee and as a result the courts were powerless to enforce any payment
even in the face of bad faith, since the trustee was relieved of the duty
of ever paying anything to the beneficiary. The court held the trust to
be a valid discretionary trust, declaring that:
courts are not powerless to enforce this trust. Trustees must always
act in good faith and always act fairly and reasonably, and a court of equity
will and can require such behaviour. Where a trustee is given uncon-
trolled discretion, as here, he acts much as a judical officer and is duty
bound to exercise sound discretion under the circumstances. A court of
equity will not tolerate abuse of sound discretion and in a proper case will
compel the exercise of discretion.9
Revocation of Trust: Burden On Trustee
To Prove Donor's Incapacity
Where the settlor of a revocable inter vivos trust "revokes" the trust,
prima facie the revocation is valid and the burden of proving settlor's in-
competency is upon the trustee when the settlor brings an action against
the trustee for reconveyance of the property. This was the rule set forth
in Kemmerer v. Kemmerer,'0 notwithstanding the fact that the settlor
had previously attempted to revoke the trust and the court had found that
he had mistaken the import of the prior revocation.
Appeal by Trustee: When Unauthorized
An appeal by one in a representative capacity, such as a trustee, is not
authorized unless the order or judgment appealed from adversely affects
or prejudices the estate which he is administering. A trustee who is
given instructions relating to the trust, who appeals therefrom, and on
appeal advocates a position of law contrary to the best interests of the
beneficiary of the trust violates the first precept of a trustee: loyalty to
the beneficiary. In the case of In re Trustee Under Yost's Will," the
court held that this conduct was such that the beneficiary's interest de-
manded removal of the trustee from office. In addition, attorneys' fees
for the prosecution of the appeal were disallowed, and all costs incurred
b the trustees in the appeal were charged against them personally. The
opinion by Judge Hunsicker represents judicial writing at its best.
'In re Ternatisky's Estates, 141 N.E.2d 189 (Ohio Ct. App. 1957).
'o139 N.E.2d 84 (Ohio Ct. App. 1956).
11141 N.E.2d 176 (Ohio Ct. App. 1956).
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Stock In Possession of Foreign Executor: Ohio Court
Has No Authority to Impress Trust
The effect of the Uniform Stock Transfer Act'2 is to embody the
shares in an Ohio corporation in the certificate for such shares, and the
situs of the shares is that of the physical location of the certificate, even
though the location is in a foreign state. Consequently the Supreme
Court in Browndll v. Colambas Clay Mfg. Co.' s held that, in an action
to engraft a trust upon such shares of stock, the subject of the action is
the certificate for such shares, and where it is outstanding and under the
previously invoked jurisdiction of a court in another state, an Ohio court
is without jurisdiction to order the corporation to transfer the interest.
Member of Stock Voting Committee Denied Counsel Fees
and Expenses Although Action For His Removal Defeated
Whiting v. Bryant'4 has a history. Prior to the present case, Whiting
and others brought an action for the removal of Bryant as one of the
persons designated to vote shares of stock of the Austin Company (of
which Bryant was president) held by the Cleveland Trust Company, as
trustee, for the benefit of Whiting and others, who were plaintiffs in the
removal action and in the present case.15 The plaintiffs claimed conflict
of interests on the part of Bryant. He successfully defended the action
for removal' 0
The present action is upon the application of Bryant for allowance
of counsel fees and expenses incurred by him in defending the removal
action. The court held that Mr. Bryant's conduct had been to the disad-
vantage of the trust beneficiaries and any enhanced value or increased
income from trust shares was incidental and insignificant in comparison
to personal benefit- and advantage gained by him. Fees and expenses
were denied. Judge Skeel dissented, pointing out that the plaintiff-bene-
ficiaries were objecting to charging the trust with expenses created by
them as a necessary result of their unsuccessful effort to remove Mr.
Bryant. A compelling argument!
ROBERT C. BENSING
5Oxrio REV. CODE §§ 1705.01-.21.
'5166 Ohio St. 324, 142 N.E.2d 511 (1957).
14144 NXE.2d 240 (Ohio Ct. App. 1957).
'For a report of the removal action, see the 1956 Survey of Ohio Law, 8 WEST.
Rns. L. REv. 379 (1957).
" 131 N.E.2d 425 (Ohio Ct. App. 1956).
19581
